






a	pan-Orthodox	level.	This	means	 that	 the	Orthodox	churches’	attitude	 towards	 the	European




of	 the	 European	 continent.	 Consequently	 the	 ecclesial	 identity	 and	 self-perception	 of	 the













by	 the	 Fourth	 Crusade	 in	 1204	 has	 made	 the	 idea	 of	 Europe	 and	 the	 Latin	 West	 a	 threat,
something	which	 remained	 politically,	 theologically,	 and	 culturally	 outside	 of	 the	 Byzantine
Orthodox	 Commonwealth	 (Kazdhan,	 2001).	 Although	 this	 opposition	 has	 often	 been
exaggerated,	 and	 ironically	 re-articulated	 through	 the	use	of	 theological	 forms	developed	by
the	 Reformation	 and	 the	 Counter-Reformation,	 it	 represents	 a	 powerful	 current	 which	 has
shaped	Orthodox	engagement	with	the	West	in	multiple	contexts.1
These	anti-Western	and	anti-European	 trends	 are	mirrored	 in	 similar	discourses	 about	 the
East	 in	 Western	 Europe.	 A	 pre-European	 Community	 discourse	 that	 shaped	 the	 agenda	 of
European	 integration	 was	 Pius	 XII’s	 Christmas	 address	 of	 1949	 that	 blessed	 the	 Christian




inception.	Greece	 joined	 in	 1981,	Cyprus	 in	 1990,	Bulgaria	 and	Romania	 in	 1995.	Thus	 by






Christians	 (Thomas	 and	O’Mahony,	 2014).	 The	 ‘West’	 has	 become	 home	 to	 a	multinational
Orthodox	 diaspora,	 which	 is	 presenting	 new	 challenges	 to	 the	 Orthodox	 hierarchies	 and
transforming	their	approaches	to	the	EU	and	its	institutions.	All	major	Orthodox	churches	now
have	representatives	actively	engaged	in	dialogue	with	the	EU	institutions	in	Brussels.	De	iure
territorial	 Orthodox	 churches	 within	 and	 beyond	 the	 EU,	 which	 operate	 within	 their	 own
canonical	soil,	demarcated	through	a	consensus	with	other	Orthodox	churches,	exercise	what
could	 be	 described	 as	 a	 de	 facto	 extra-territorial	 ecclesiastical	 jurisdiction	 amongst	 their







At	 the	 same	 time	another	 trend	 is	 emerging	 in	 a	number	of	EU	countries	–	pan-Orthodox,
transnational	 multi-jurisdictional	 episcopal	 conferences	 formed	 by	 representatives	 of	 all
Orthodox	 jurisdictions	 operating	 within	 a	 particular	 country	 are	 seeking	 to	 overcome	 old
ethnic	 and	 jurisdictional	 divisions.3	 In	 addition	 the	 Patriarchates	 of	 Constantinople	 and
Moscow,	 although	 technically	 outside	 of	 the	 EU,	 actively	 engage	 in	 the	Orthodox	 discourse
within	 the	EU	and	shape	 it	directly	or	 indirectly	 through	their	engagement	with	 the	Orthodox
diasporas	 under	 their	 control.	 A	 number	 of	Orthodox	 churches	 belong	 to	 the	 Conference	 of
European	 Churches	 (CEC),	 where	 they	 cooperate	 with	 Protestant	 churches	 in	 Europe	 and
develop	fairly	sophisticated	ways	of	lobbying	in	the	EU.	It	might	seem	that	after	the	experience







the	 conversations	 stimulated	 by	Article	 17	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 are	 not	 always	 irenic.	 The
economic	 meltdown	 in	 Greece	 and	 Cyprus	 evoked	 a	 number	 of	 statements	 of	 Orthodox
hierarchs	 that	 were	 not	 particularly	 EU-friendly.	 The	 bishops	 of	 the	 Church	 of	 Greece




of	 the	 Orthodox	 churches	 within	 the	 EU.	 Historically	 these	 churches	 have	 been	 heavily
dependent	on	state	support	and	there	have	been	very	few	legal	provisions	for	those	churches	to
develop	 their	 own	 charitable	 networks.	 The	 pressure	 on	 the	 churches	 to	 provide	 greater
support	 to	 unprecedentedly	 impoverished	 populations,	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 state
infrastructure	and	financial	support	through	which	to	conduct	their	charitable	work	in	the	past,
has	prompted	 the	churches	 in	Greece	and	Cyprus	 to	develop	 their	own	grassroots	networks,
some	of	which	will	inevitably	rely	on	funding	streams	from	the	EU.	While	these	networks	are








international	 institutions,	 remains	 deeply	 sceptical	 and	 driven	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 protect	 the






Furthermore,	 having	 developed	 its	 own	 social	 doctrine	 (unique	 within	 the	 world	 of	 the
Orthodox	 churches)	 and	 its	 own	 ‘Orthodox	 Bill	 of	 Rights’	 (Moscow	 Patriarchate,	 n.d.)	 the
Moscow	 Patriarchate	 promotes	 some	 distinctly	 sceptical	 perspectives	 about	 existing	 human
rights	 mechanisms	 and	 this	 includes	 the	 human	 rights	 culture	 of	 the	 EU.	 In	 this	 respect	 the
Moscow	Patriarchate’s	positioning	 towards	 the	EU	has	 to	be	seen	as	a	wider	project	which
links	 up	 with	 Russia’s	 continuous	 attempts	 to	 reconceptualise	 international	 law	 as	 a
sovereignty-driven	rather	 than	a	 rights	protection-driven	 legal	system.	The	‘Orthodox	Bill	of
Rights’	 amplifies	 this	 argument	 and	 prepares	 the	 ground	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 Orthodox




communities	 has	 always	 been	 pragmatic	 and	 since	 the	 fall	 of	 Constantinople	 and	 the	 1917
Russian	Revolution,	 normally	 not	 theologically	 driven.	Moreover,	 the	 churches’	 engagement
with	 political	 communities	 continues	 to	 be	 shaped	 by	 their	 inter-ecclesial	 dynamics	 and
tensions.	For	example,	the	increasing	tensions	between	Moscow	and	Constantinople	over	the
primacy	 of	 honour	 of	 the	 See	 of	 Constantinople	 and	 over	 its	 extra-territorial	 jurisdiction,
tensions	between	Moscow	and	other	local	Orthodox	churches	(Ukraine,	Romania,	Estonia)	and
very	 close	 relations	 with	 others	 (Bulgaria,	 Serbia,	 Georgia,	 Antioch),	 in	many	ways	 shape
pragmatic	 alliances	 between	 particular	 local	 Orthodox	 churches	 and	 political	 communities.
Because	of	this	dynamic	and	multi-layered	picture	we	can	only	speak	about	multiple	Orthodox
Christian	perspectives	towards	the	EU.	Some	Orthodox	churches	(Romania,	Estonia)	are	quite
openly	 pro-EU	 in	 their	 public	 statements.	 Others	 (Bulgaria,	 Greece,	 Cyprus)	 connect	 in	 a
pragmatic	 fashion	with	 the	EU,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 remaining	very	critical	 towards	 certain	EU
positions	and	policies.	A	number	of	Orthodox	churches	within	and	outside	 the	EU	(Georgia,
Bulgaria,	Serbia)	have	maintained	their	close	ties	with	Moscow.	This	has	largely	determined
their	 approach	 to	 the	EU	 and	 the	 international	 community.	 In	 addition,	 the	Russian	 state	 has




Thus	 we	 can	 only	 speak	 of	 multiple	 Orthodox	 approaches	 to	 the	 EU	 driven	 by	 different
configurations	 of	 local	 Orthodox	 churches,	 shaped	 by	 concerns	 about	 the	 integrity	 of	 their
canonical	 soil,	 defensiveness	 against	 interventions	 from	other	Orthodox	 and	 sometimes	non-
Orthodox	 churches	 as	 well	 as	 by	 their	 own	 specific	 needs.	 Their	 relationships	 with
governments	 and	 international	 organisations	 are	 driven	 by	 both	 principles	 and	 pragmatic
responses	 to	 policies	 or	 to	 governments’	 engagements	 with	 international	 organisations	 and
international	 affairs.	 This	 also	 means	 that	 different	 alliances	 or	 groupings	 emerge	 when
different	 agendas	 or	 shared	 interests	 emerge.	 Some	 of	 the	 multi-layered	 inter-ecclesial
relations	may	determine	the	formation	of	a	particular	grouping	united	around	a	specific	agenda,
or	 individual	 Orthodox	 churches	 could	 simply	 use	 open	 ecclesiastical	 channels	 to	 pursue
particular	 agendas.	When	Russia	banned	EU	 food	 imports	 in	 response	 to	EU	sanctions	over
Ukraine	 the	 Churches	 of	 Greece	 and	 Cyprus	 used	 their	 open	 channels	 with	 the	 Moscow
Patriarchate	to	lobby	the	Russian	government	to	relax	parts	of	the	ban	(Kalmouki,	2014).
These	 interactions	 suggest	 that	 foreign	 policy	 analysts	 cannot	 underestimate	 the	 potential
impact	 and	 role	 an	 aspired	 Orthodox	 Commonwealth	 may	 have	 on	 the	 shaping	 of	 the
interactions	 between	 the	 Orthodox	 churches	 and	 EU	 institutions.	 It	 presents	 analytical
challenges	 to	 the	 existing	 foreign	 policy	 approaches,	 and	 perhaps	 also	 challenges	 and




certainly	be	attracted	 to	 the	 idea	of	asserting	 the	 levels	of	soft	power	within	and	beyond	the
Orthodox	world	that	this	commonwealth	permitted	and	which	closely	guarded	modern	nation-
states	 restricted.	 Understanding	 the	 grammar	 of	 the	 ‘soft	 power’	 of	 the	 Byzantine	Orthodox
Commonwealth	 tells	 us	 a	 great	 deal	 about	 interdependence	 and	 complex	 relations	 between
states	(Nye,	2009)	and	of	the	complex	interplay	and	interdependence	between	religion	and	the
state.
It	 will	 be	 impossible	 to	 understand,	 and	 catastrophic	 to	 ignore,	 the	 positioning	 of	 the
Orthodox	 churches	 in	 the	 public	 sphere	 today	 and	 in	 the	 past	 without	 a	 good	 grasp	 of	 the




of	 the	 outbreak	of	 the	Balkan	wars.	The	 end	of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	 the	 emergence	 of
nation-states	 and	 de	 facto	 national	 churches	 was	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Byzantine	 Commonwealth
(Obolensky,	 2000),	 with	 Byzantium	 as	 a	 widely	 spread	 and	 varied	 complex	 with	 multiple
centres,	 each	 with	 its	 own	 set	 of	 relationships	 and	 connections.	 It	 became	 a	 centre	 of
concentric	 circles	 of	 influence	 and	 “soft	 power”,	 with	 “horizontal”	 as	 well	 as	 hierarchical
strands	of	connection	through	“its	credible	show	of	majesty	and	piety”	(Shepard,	2006:	36–41)
embodying	 the	 prestige	 of	 centuries	 of	 history.	 In	 a	 sophisticated	 ‘symphony	 of	 powers’,
imperial	 office	 and	 the	 church	 together	 exercised	 soft	 power	 through	 their	 parallel	 and
interconnected	networks	throughout	the	Byzantine	Commonwealth.	It	is	through	this	exercise	of
soft	 power	 that	 other	 rulers	 found	 their	 models	 for	 imitation	 and	 wanted	 to	 associate
themselves	with	this	glittering	symbol	of	imperial	and	court	life	and	of	the	Orthodox	faith.	The
decline	of	 the	empire	placed	an	 increased	emphasis	on	 the	role	of	 the	patriarch,	both	within
Constantinople	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 imperial	 office	 and	 outside	 it	 through	 Mount	 Athos	 as	 a
microcosm	of	the	Orthodox	commonwealth,	and	on	the	need	to	deal	diplomatically	and	in	other
ways	 with	 a	 complex	 variety	 of	 external	 actors	 (Cameron,	 2011:	 21–24).	 After	 the	 fall	 of
Constantinople	 it	 was	 the	 ecumenical	 patriarch	 and	 the	 monks	 on	 Mount	 Athos	 who	 still
represented	that	shared	consciousness	(Cameron,	2011).	The	Ecumenical	Patriarchate,	Mount
Athos,	 and	 Moscow’s	 claim	 as	 ‘The	 Third	 Rome’,	 continue	 to	 serve	 that	 representative
function	today.
Orthodox	networks	and	cooperation	within	the	EU	today	are	only	a	bleak	resemblance	of	the
Byzantine	Commonwealth	 that	survived	 the	Ottomans	(but	not	 the	Balkan	Wars)	and	retained
some	 fragments	of	cooperation	 in	a	contemporary	context.	 It	would	nevertheless	be	naïve	 to
underestimate	 the	 residual	 energy	of	 the	Orthodox	Commonwealth,	which	 is	 gradually	being
reconstituted	 in	 different	 contexts	 and	 has	 all	 the	 facilities	 to	 thrive	 within	 an	 EU	 context.
Whatever	one	thinks	of	 the	legacy	of	 the	Orthodox	Commonwealth	from	the	point	of	view	of
foreign	policy	analysis	it	will	be	a	grave	error	not	to	factor	in	existing	ambitions	and	existing






of	 the	 Holy	 Liturgy.	 Articulated	 primarily	 within	 a	 liturgical	 space	 demarcated	 by	 the
beginning	bidding	prayer	–	‘Blessed	is	the	Kingdom	of	the	Father,	the	Son,	and	the	Holy	Spirit’
–	and	by	 the	sense	 that	past,	present,	and	 the	Second	Coming	of	Christ	are	united	within	 the
boundaries	 of	 the	 liturgy.	 Orthodox	 political	 theology	 is	 in	 a	 sense	 perceived	 as	 something
which	transforms	the	world	in	the	stillness	of	a	moment	which	brings	past,	present,	and	future
together,	but	much	less	so	 through	social	action.	This	does	not	mean	 that	social	action	 is	not
possible	 or	 desirable.	 But	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 church	 does	 not	 preach	 for	 political
change	outside	of	 the	context	of	 the	Eucharistic	 theology	of	the	Orthodox	liturgy.	Striving	for
social	change	in	the	secular	world	would	be	perceived	as	a	form	of	social	engineering	which
would	 replace	 the	 imminent	 Second	 Coming	 and	 would	 be	 considered	 to	 be	 potentially
idolatrous.	 Social	 and	 political	 action	 in	 this	 sense	 is	 driven	 by	 an	 internal	 spiritual
transformation,	not	by	following	strategies	of	appropriate	social	or	political	engagement.	The
people	 of	 God	 therefore	 bear	 witness	 through	 patterns	 that	 are	 often	 difficult	 to	 assign	 to
recognizable	 forms	of	 social	 engagement.	On	 that	 level,	 since	 the	death	of	 the	 last	Christian





the	 Orthodox	 churches	 and	 the	 states	 they	 inhabit.	 But	 it	 will	 be	 very	 hard	 to	 deny	 that
Orthodox	churches	have	always	been	heavily	dependent	on	the	promulgation	of	church	dogma
through	 its	 incorporation	 within	 imperial	 law.	 Since	 the	 fall	 of	 Constantinople	 and	 the
emergence	of	national	Orthodox	churches	in	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries,	the	community
of	Orthodox	churches	has	never	attempted	to	address	the	question	of	how	they	as	a	communion
of	 churches	 genuinely	 relate	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 law	 as	 a	 normative	 structure	 parallel	 to	 their
dogmatic	 normative	 corpus	 and	 body	 of	 ecclesiastical	 laws.	Without	 engaging	 head-on	with
these	questions,	 the	Orthodox	churches	have	developed	pragmatic	 ‘realist’	 relations	with	 the
political	 communities	 whose	 domains	 they	 inhabit.	 Those	 relations	 often	 border	 on
compromise	 –	Orthodox	 churches	 have	 always	 been	 accused	 of	 remaining	 silent	 about	 state
persecutions	 (although	 such	 a	 view	 does	 not	 necessarily	 take	 into	 account	 the	 significant
number	of	 the	members	of	 those	churches	who	did	bear	a	 silent	witness	and	often	paid,	and





One	 of	 the	 central	 challenges	 of	 engagement	with	 the	EU	 stems	 from	 the	 premise	 that	 the
Orthodox	 churches	 approach	 the	world	 through	 a	 theological	 lens	 inherently	 articulated	 via
dogmatics.	This	focuses	on	‘ontology’	as	a	way	to	fulfil	human	personality	through	particular
perspectives	 and	 strategies	 about	 divine	 knowledge.	 This	 view	 is	 inherently	 suspicious	 of
ethics-driven	 (rather	 than	 dogmatics-driven)	 approaches	 because	 of	 their	 overemphasis	 on






creative	 theologians.	One	of	 the	key	failures	 in	 religious	organisations’	engagement	with	any
forms	 of	 regional	 or	 global	 political	 structures	 has	 been	 that	 they	 have	 often	 perceived
institutional	 internationalization	as	a	 form	of	competitive	 theology	 (even	 though	 international
institutional	projects	never	were	and	were	never	 intended	 to	be	 theological	paradigms)	with
which	they	have	to	engage	theologically.	This	suspicion	has	extended	to	the	EU.	The	Orthodox
rapprochement	as	a	result	has	been	inherently	utilitarian.	Consequently	there	is	nothing	in	terms








of	 Orthodox	 theological	 thinking	 that	 assume	 the	 EU	 is	 yet	 another	 political	 community	 the
church	 prays	 for	 but	 does	 not	 engage	 with.	 A	more	 interesting	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 EU
would	create	an	environment	for	thriving	Orthodox	communities	and	whether	they	are	likely	to
appreciate	 that.	 Does	 the	 EU	 as	 a	 particular	 legal	 order	 fit	 into	 some	 of	 the	 central
ideas/premises	 of	 Orthodox	 theology	 or	 does	 this	 particular	 legal	 order	 make	 Orthodox
theology	more	difficult	to	articulate?
On	several	 levels	one	could	propose	 that	 the	EU	is	a	 fertile	ground	for	 thriving	Orthodox
theology.	It	creates	a	melting	pot	that	helps	Orthodox	communities	come	out	of	the	Babylonian
captivity	 of	 religious	 nationalism	 and	 compromising	 church-state	 relations	 driven	 by
Enlightenment	and	Ottoman	political	 forms.	The	EU	also	makes	churches	more	engaged	with
one	another	and	more	ecumenical.	It	seems	that	the	dilution	of	political	boundaries	has	helped




It’)	 interactions	with	 the	Other,	which	shape	what	 is	generally	understood	as	social	currents.
Sobornost	alludes	to	a	dialogical	and	mystical	‘I-Thou’	encounter	within	the	Body	of	Christ,
making	 the	 above	 mentioned	 individualized	 interaction	 in	 the	 context	 of	 sociality	 more
coherent	and	possible	to	exercise	(Zizioulas,	2006;	Frank,	1992).	The	EU	may	seem	to	offer
prospects	 for	 this	kind	of	 social	 cohesion.	Yet	 the	growing	Orthodox	diaspora	 increases	 the
awareness	 that	 a	 fragmentation	 of	 national	 belonging	 presents	 opportunities,	 challenges,	 and














to	 support	 the	mission	of	 the	Church.	This	 ‘engaged	dis-engagement’	presents	challenges	 for
both	 ecclesial	 and	 political	 communities.	At	 the	 same	 time	 it	 presents	 the	 possibilities	 of	 a
‘living	Christendom’	where	the	salvation	of	souls	pursued	by	the	Church	is	not	locked	into	a
dependence	on	a	political	community	that	has	to	facilitate	the	mission	of	the	Church.	In	the	case
of	 the	Orthodox	churches,	a	Thomist-style	participation	 in	public	 reason	does	not	emphasise
the	conversion	of	political	institutions,	but	rather	the	fulfillment	of	human	persons.	Attempts	to
convert	 political	 institutions	 are	 viewed	 with	 great	 suspicion	 because	 they	 may	 seem
potentially	idolatrous,	utilitarian,	and	technology-driven,	rather	than	‘ontological’	projects,	that
is,	projects	which	recognise	and	embrace	the	sacramental	character	of	the	world.	Through	an
Orthodox	 theological	 lens	 “man’s	 relation	 to	 God	 is	 not	 simply	 an	 intellectual	 and	 ethical




No	matter	how	far	 technology	develops,	 it	never	ceases	 to	be	a	utilization	 of	 the	world
which	 is	 necessary,	 legitimate,	 and	 commendable.	 The	 absolute	 importance	 assigned	 to
technology	expresses	an	attitude	of	a	particular	kind	of	utilization	of	the	world;	a	utilization
which	does	not	view	the	created	order	as	the	handiwork	of	a	personal	God,	nor	seeks	to









competitive	 theology	 which	 they	 have	 to	 reshape	 and	 with	 which	 they	 have	 to	 engage	 in
theological	disputation.	The	Orthodox	churches	in	contrast	have	maintained	that	their	authentic
position	 in	 relation	 to	 civil	 law	 or	 any	 form	 of	 non-ecclesiastical	 law	 is	 always	 projected
through	the	pastoral	lens	of	canon	law	(civil	law	punishes,	canon	law	heals).	They	engage	with
such	parallel	legal	orders	through	parallel	canonical	approaches,	but	they	are	not	expected	to
adopt,	 endorse,	or	 reject	 any	approaches	of	 civil	 law,	whether	punitive	or	 tolerant,	 in	areas
which	 would	 largely	 be	 considered	 in	 a	 Western	 Christian	 context	 to	 be	 broadly	 a	 clash
between	Divine,	natural	law	and	civil	law.
This	does	not	mean	to	say	that	Orthodox	churches	will	not	assert	their	theological	positions
in	 areas	 of	 concern	 in	 common	 with	 other	 churches.	 It	 is,	 however,	 less	 likely	 that	 these
positions	 will	 be	 articulated	 as	 ‘mechanical’	 Christian	 social	 engineering	 projects	 such	 as
often	emerge	in	the	political	theology	of	the	Western	Christian	tradition	(and	to	some	extent	in
the	methodological	emphases	of	 ‘new	natural	 law’	 theories	of	authors	 such	as	Finnis	 [2011]
and	George	 [1999]).	 In	 this	 respect	 the	Orthodox	churches	 remain	and	will	probably	 remain
uninterested	in	political	or	legal	institutions.	One	of	the	reasons	that	this	is	unlikely	to	change
is	the	inherently	dialogical	rather	than	hierarchical	institutionalism	of	the	Orthodox	churches,	a






will	create	 the	environment	needed	for	 the	Orthodox	churches	 to	get	accustomed	to	engaging




which	 open	 up	 towards	 sociality	 and	 sobornorst.	 This	 approach,	 articulated	 by	 certain	 key
Orthodox	 theologians,	 derives	 from	 the	 Christological	 formulations	 of	 the	 Council	 of
Chalcedon	 (451	 AD).	 It	 emphasizes	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 personal	 authority	 of	 each	 Christian,
centred	on	the	powers	entrusted	to	each	person	though	baptism	(‘priest’,	‘prophet’,	and	‘king’)
and	 on	 the	 people	 of	 God	 together	 as	 ‘shield-bearers	 of	 truth’.	 This	 dialogical	 dynamic
between	ecclesiastical	hierarchy	and	people	of	God,	one	of	promulgation	and	reception,	can
allow	 for	 many	 different	 forms	 of	 engagement	 in	 different	 situations	 and	 with	 diverse
configurations	of	groups	and	individuals.	The	fulfillment	of	these	roles	within	an	ecclesiastical
context	means	that	relating	to	the	world,	individually	or	in	a	community,	transforms	the	world





Faith’,	 a	 ‘priesthood	 of	 all	 believers’	 co-responsible	 for	 shaping	 the	 church	 and	 the	world
(Ware,	1970).	This	is	a	role	that	the	Orthodox	laity	may	now	extend	to	the	forms	through	which
its	churches	engage	with	the	EU.	This	means	that	Orthodox	theology	has	by	default	provided	(at
least	 in	 theory)	 greater	 space	 for	 the	 role	 of	 laity	 through	 the	 process	 of	 reception.	 It	 also
suggests	 greater	 opportunities	 for	 dialogue	 rather	 than	 simply	 top-down	 clerical	 decision
making.	It	implies	that,	outside	as	well	as	within	the	church,	complex	networks	of	clergy	and
laity	 will	 speak	with	 a	 plurality	 of	 voices	 about	 the	 churches’	 engagement	 with	 the	 world.
More	 importantly	 if	 the	 ‘People	 of	God’	 choose	 to	 exercise	 their	 role	 as	 ‘shield	 bearers	 of
truth’	 in	 a	 secular	 context,	 they	 and	 their	 associations	may	play	 a	 pivotal	 role	 in	 preventing
ecclesiastical	institutions	from	losing	their	theological	voices	by	being	too	sceptical	or	over-
confident	about	the	benefits	of	their	interactions	with	political	communities.	In	order	for	this	to
happen	 the	 people	 of	God	have	 to	 awaken	 and	 acknowledge	 their	 responsibilities.	This	 has
already	 been	 happening,	 in	 differing	 degrees	 in	 different	 Orthodox	 churches.	 In	 some,
reclaiming	 their	 ancestors’	 religion	has	 been	 seen	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 a	 new	 freedom.	But	 in	many
contexts	 this	 sense	 of	 freedom	has	 led	 to	 complacency	 in	 treating	 their	 churches	 as	 cultural
monuments	or	a	plant	they	fondly	grow	in	their	back	garden.
This	is	an	untapped	potential	of	the	role	of	the	‘People	of	God.’	Following	the	Greek	crisis,
the	 growth	 of	 grassroots	 charities	 with	 strong	 EU	 connections	 and	 endorsement	 from	 the
Church	 of	 Greece	 may	 be	 the	 first	 signs	 of	 greater	 lay	 engagement	 alongside	 that	 of
ecclesiastical	institutions.	This	trend,	however,	does	not	translate	across	all	churches.	In	some




Christian	 organisations	 is	 developed	 and	 strengthened.	 Moving	 in	 that	 direction	 would
certainly	 make	 sense,	 particularly	 in	 countries	 where	 the	 Orthodox	 church	 is	 stagnated	 by
declining	 ordinations	 and	 monastic	 vocations,	 ecclesiastical	 corruption,	 dilapidated	 parish
structures,	lack	of	education,	and	a	hard-line	hierarchical	defence	of	a	status	quo	beneficial	for
a	particular	brand	of	Orthodoxy.	In	such	cases	EU	institutions	should	be	reluctant	to	designate
gatekeepers	 with	 whom	 they	 choose	 to	 work.	 Broadening	 the	 roster	 of	 interlocutors	 will
strengthen	the	role	and	the	forms	of	lay	(re)engagement	on	the	ground	and	will	have	an	impact
on	 the	 ways	 local	 Orthodox	 churches	 engage	 with	 current	 issues.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 EU
involvement	 in	 domestic	 ecclesiastical	 politics	 must	 proceed	 with	 a	 due	 care	 for	 religious
autonomy.	A	complex	case	such	as	the	right	to	access	to	Mount	Athos	on	the	negotiation	table
could	easily	kill	all	negotiations.
We	 see,	 then,	 that	 one	 of	 the	main	 features	 of	 the	 engagement	with	 the	 idea	 of	 the	EU	by
Orthodox	churches	is	a	great	diversity	of	voices	not	easy	to	reconcile.	Some	Orthodox	bishops




one	 hand,	 they	 have	 less	 historical	 baggage	 compared	 to	 the	Roman	Catholic	Church	 and	 a
number	 of	 European	 Protestant	 Churches.	 These	 have	 seen	 their	 ecclesial	 identities	 shaped
through	 an	 evolving	 expectation	 of	 being	 (albeit	 in	 a	 different	 way)	 co-participants	 in	 the
articulation	 of	 public	 reason.	To	 avoid	 such	 an	 expectation,	Orthodox	 churches	 are	 perhaps
theologically	reluctant	to	spell	out	a	particular	contemporary	commitment	of	engagement	with
the	 political.8	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 Orthodox	 political	 theology,
Orthodox	churches	(and,	for	example,	Orthodox	MEPs)	seem	to	adopt	a	plethora	of	political
theologies.	Some	of	 those	are	fragments,	others	are	hybrids,	while	most	are	borrowed	either











The	 Church	 of	 Greece,	 Cyprus,	 Romania,	 and	 the	 ROC	 have	 representations	 in	 Brussels.
Those	churches	along	with	a	number	of	other	local	Orthodox	churches	are	also	represented	by
the	CEC.	The	membership	of	CEC	goes	beyond	the	boundaries	of	the	EU	and	indicates	once
again	 that	 the	 interplay	 between	 inter-Orthodox	 relations	 and	 Orthodox	 interactions	 with
European	 institutions	 are	 complex.	 In	 addition,	 a	 Committee	 of	 the	 Representatives	 of	 the
Orthodox	 Churches	 at	 the	 European	 Union	 (CROCEU)	 meets	 regularly	 and	 develops	 joint
strategies.	 Their	 recent	 statement	 (coordinated	 with	 CEC	 policy)	 could	 be	 considered	 a
blueprint	about	the	future	directions	of	engagement	of	the	Orthodox	churches	with	the	European
Union.	 The	 statement,	 agreed	 and	 issued	 prior	 to	 the	 upcoming	 elections	 for	 the	 European
Parliament	of	May	2014,	is	indicative	of	the	consolidation	of	an	agreed	pan-Orthodox	agenda
to	 be	 pursued	 before	 the	 European	 institutions.	 In	 it	 the	 enlarged	 responsibilities	 and
competencies	of	 the	European	Parliament	according	 to	 the	Lisbon	Treaty	are	considered	and






the	 consolidation	 of	 social	 standards,	 dignity	 in	 life	 and	 security	 in	 society.	All	 share	 a
responsibility	for	building	and	developing	institutions	by	all	means	socially,	economically
and	 environmentally	 sustainable.	 Christians	 are	 encouraged	 to	 take	 active	 part	 in	 the
elections	and,	thus,	to	contribute	to	the	improvement	of	the	European	project.
(CROCEU,	2014)
The	 CROCEU	 statement	 commits	 Orthodox	 Representatives	 to	 work	 together	 with	 any
competent	 authority	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 such	 goals.	 The	 document	 deals,	 inter	 alia,	 with
sustainability-driven	environmental	policies,	the	protection	of	human	dignity,	the	right	to	life,
family	life	(marriage	defined	as	a	union	between	a	man	and	a	woman),	gender	equality,	social
investment	 policies	 tackling	 social	 exclusion,	 unemployment	 and	 poverty,	 guaranteeing	 a
minimum	wage,	 care	 for	 the	most	vulnerable	members	of	 the	 society	 and	commitment	 to	 the
common	good	of	the	people,	and	to	a	dialogue	encouraging	co-responsibility	and	cooperation











belief	 or	 conviction	 in	 fact	 work	 for	 promoting	 the	 values	 of	 peace	 and	 justice	 in	 the
society.	What	is	more,	it	is	a	duty	for	any	state	to	secure	access	to	efficient	social	services
for	all	especially	at	a	time	of	deepening	crisis.
•	 	 	 Education	 strategies	 for	 democratic	 citizens	 who	 respect	 human	 rights	 and	 intercultural
competences.




position	 papers	 of	 individual	 Orthodox	 churches	 a	 pan-Orthodox	 position	 in	 relation	 to
individual	human	rights.	This	endorsement	of	human	rights	 is	at	odds	with	some	fundamental
positions	 of	 some	 of	 the	 local	 Orthodox	 churches,	 voiced	 as	 a	 religious	 critique	 of
international	law	(albeit	borrowed	directly	from	a	CEC	statement).




political	 commitment	 to	 democratic	 elections,	 echoing	 the	 grammar	 of	 solidarity	 of	 the
Christian	Democratic	movements	of	the	early	post-second	world	war	period.	Appropriation	of
such	typically	Roman	Catholic	political	language	is	already	significant	enough.	But	what	must
be	 kept	 in	 mind	 is	 how	 differently	 the	 Orthodox	 churches	 relate	 to	 the	 EU	 institutions	 in
Brussels	 as	 opposed	 to	 at	 home.	 While	 their	 representatives	 endorse	 the	 above	 values	 in
Brussels,	many	of	the	national	Orthodox	churches	have	been	historically	silent	during	national
parliamentary	elections	and	have	often	endorsed	fairly	unsavory	political	elites.	Papathanasiou
(2013)	 even	 goes	 so	 far	 as	 to	 identify	 a	 national-socialist	 grammar	 in	 the	 statements	 of	 the
Church	of	Greece	and	its	alignment	with	the	far	right,	especially	after	the	economic	downturn.
This	 invites	 two	 possible	 explanations.	 One	 is	 that	 when	 engaging	 with	 EU	 institutions,
policies	 and	 law	 at	 home	 and	 abroad,	 the	 Orthodox	 churches	 simply	 cater	 for	 different





From	a	policy	point	 of	 view	 this	might	 be	 a	 significant	 development.	 It	 represents	 closer
engagement	 by	 Orthodox	 churches	 with	 regional	 and	 international	 institutions	 and	 even	 a
willingness	 to	 endorse	 human	 rights	 at	 a	 EU	 level,	 even	while	 the	 same	 churches	 are	 quite
reluctant	to	do	so	and	often	do	exactly	the	opposite	at	a	national	level.	Driven	by	their	complex
inter-ecclesial	 relations	and	 inherent	 tensions,	by	complex	and	 reconciled	 relationships	with
the	states	where	their	mother	churches	reside,	and	by	pure	pragmatism,	the	Orthodox	churches
articulate	their	positions	in	a	highly	contextualized	fashion.	The	ROC	would	speak	in	one	way
as	 an	 autocephalous	 church	 responsible	 for	 the	 Russian	 Commonwealth	 and	 by	 pursuing
foreign	 policy	 agendas	 aligned	with	 the	 foreign	 policy	 agendas	 of	 the	Russian	 state.	At	 the
same	time	it	may	speak	very	differently	as	a	member	of	CEC	or	CROCUE	before	the	European
institutions.	 The	 same	 would	 apply	 to	 the	 churches	 of	 Romania,	 Bulgaria,	 Cyprus,	 Greece,
Serbia,	Albania,	and	the	Ecumenical	Patriarchate	of	Constantinople.	While	united	in	doctrine,
these	 churches	 have	 been	 historically	 aligned	 in	 complex	 church-state	 relations	 and	 inter-
ecclesial	 relations	 either	 close	 to	 ROC	 or	 to	 Constantinople,	 or	 acting	 fairly	 independently
both	in	terms	of	relations	with	the	major	patriarchates	and	in	terms	of	attitudes	to	Europe.
Thus	 it	would	 be	 a	 gross	 oversimplification	 to	 try	 to	 consolidate	 this	 complex	mosaic	 in
order	to	adopt	a	common	interpretation	of	all	Orthodox	churches	(as	it	would	be	in	the	case	of
the	 Roman	 Catholic	 Church	 and	 the	 churches	 sui	 iuris	 in	 communion	 with	 Rome).	 A	 very
important	starting	point	would	be	to	focus	on	what	these	churches	share	in	common	in	terms	of
an	 understanding	 of	 unity	 between	 doctrine	 and	 spirituality	 and	 what	 are	 the	 examples	 of
departure	 from	 their	 common	 tradition.	 On	 that	 level,	 issues	 such	 as	 homosexuality	 and







united	 by	 common	 doctrine.	 In	 doing	 so,	 EU	 institutions	 have	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 inherent
challenges	of	such	a	complex	engagement.	This	would	require	balancing	an	awareness	of	the
importance	 both	 of	 the	 hierarchical	 structures	 and	 of	 an	 independent,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time
properly	 endorsed	 and	 integrated,	 grassroots	 engagement	with	Orthodox	 laity.	This	might	 be
pursued,	for	example,	by	championing	programmes	that	would	develop	Orthodoxy’s	legitimate
voice	 in	 the	 true	 spirit	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 subsidiarity.	 For	 one	 leading	 contemporary
theologian,	this	includes	paying	attention	also	to	the	priority	of	the	local	parish	itself:
Only	 the	 life	of	 the	parish	can	give	a	priestly	dimension	 to	politics,	a	prophetic	spirit	 to
science,	 a	 philanthropic	 concern	 to	 economics,	 a	 sacramental	 character	 to	 love.	…	The









the	West.	 The	 role	 of	Orthodox	 theology	within	 the	 historical	 and	 cultural	milieu	 of	 the
West	 is	 to	draw	attention	 to	 the	eschatological	witness	of	 the	Church	as	embodied	 in	 the
parish.
(Yannaras,	1973:	146)
It	 also	 means	 that	 EU	 interlocutors	 would	 need	 to	 acquire	 the	 necessary	 religious	 literacy
enabling	them	to	develop	broader	coalitions	with	Orthodox	faith-based	organisations	(FBOs).
This	 could	 involve	 the	 following:	 (1)	 identifying	 feasible	 conversations	 to	 pursue	 and
distinguishing	 them	 from	 those	 that	 would	 be	 premature;	 (2)	 understanding	 the	 agenda	 of
individual	Orthodox	FBOs	as	well	as	the	group	dynamics	of	all	Orthodox	FBOs	in	Brussels;







to	 incorporate	an	awareness	of	 the	pivotal	 role	of	 the	distinctive	 theological	discourses	and
voices	already	touched	on	in	this	chapter.9
EU	 actors	might	 also	 seek	 to	 recognise	 that	 some	 of	 the	 sceptical	 perspectives	Orthodox
(and	 other	 religious)	 voices	 raise	 about	 the	 work	 of	 international	 institutions	 are	 not
completely	 misguided.	 International	 organisations	 and	 EU	 institutions	 will	 always	 face	 the




them	 take	 into	 account	 the	 complexities	 of	 polyphonic	 voices.	 A	 calibrated	 approach	 to
political	 institutions	 through	 the	 ontological	 lens	 of	 Christian	 dogmatics	 can	 and	 should
contribute,	 in	 the	words	 of	 Jacques	Delors,	 to	 reinvigorating	 the	 ‘European	 soul’	 through	 a
genuine	 social	 concern	 beyond	 a	 mere	 political	 and	 legal	 technological	 statecraft.	 A	 leap










2	 	 	Since	1973	and	until	very	recently	 the	Orthodox	Church	in	Oxford	had	two	parishes	with	 two	bishops	of	 two	jurisdictions
(Constantinople	and	Moscow)	and	two	calendars.
3			Some	of	those	include	assemblies	in	the	USA,	France,	UK,	Spain,	and	Portugal.






scholastic	methodology	and	its	 intellectual	effort	 to	master	 the	realm	of	accessible	 truth	by	defining	and	distinguishing	the
boundaries	between	man’s	capacities	and	the	 transcendent	reality	of	God.	A	paradigmatic	example	of	 this	‘technological’
approach	 to	 theology	 is	 the	 definition	 of	 theology	 in	 Aquinas:	 “Nevertheless	 sacred	 teaching	 also	makes	 use	 of	 human
reasoning,	not	indeed	to	prove	the	faith	(for	that	would	do	away	with	the	merit	of	believing)	but	to	render	manifest	some	of
the	things	which	are	delivered	in	this	teaching.”	(ST	I,	Q	1,	A	8,	ad	2).
8	 	 	Strictly,	 the	only	appropriate	 form	of	government	where	 the	Church	could	actively	engage	remains	a	Christian	 theocracy.
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